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,ARTICLE

THE UNEXCEPTIONAL
U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS RUDs

JACK GOLDSMITH*

The United States helped create international human rights law, much
of which reflects principles developed under the U.S. Constitution. It has
been an enthusiastic supporter of the international human rights law movement for decades. And it has ratified four of the most important international human rights treaties: the Genocide Convention, the Torture
Convention (CAT), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), and the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).
But the United States has also consistently attached conditions to these
treaty ratifications, in the form of reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs). These RUDs have "evoked criticism abroad and dismayed
supporters of ratification in the United States,,,1 and have provoked the
charge that U.S. ratifications of human rights treaties with RUDs are "specious, meretricious, hypocritical.,,2 Critics complain that the reservations
that are "designed to reject any obligation to rise above existing law and
practice are of dubious propriety,"3 and lead "[e]ven friends of the United
States [to object] that its reservations are incompatible,,4 with the treaties'
object and purpose to promote human rights through the assumption of universal human rights norms. In addition, the "U.S. practice of declaring
human rights conventions non-self-executing is commonly seen as of a
piece with the other RUDs,"5 and "confirms that United States adherence

* Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. For helpful comments, I
thank Mark Mosier, Alexander Slater, and Conor McCarthy; participants at the Carr Center research seminar (especially Michael Ignatieff), Georgetown Law School, and Harvard Law School
workshops; and the University of St. Thomas School of Law symposium.
1. Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Treaties: The Ghost of Senator Brickel',
89 Am. J. IntI. L. 341, 341 (1995).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 343.
4. Id.
5. /d. at 346.
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remains essentially empty"6 and that "the United States does not take
[human rights treaties] seriously as international obligations."7 Professor
Henkin sums up the conventional wisdom when he concludes that "U.S.
[human rights treaty] ratification practice threatens to undermine a half-century of effort to establish international human rights standards as internationallaw."8
This essay seeks to deflate some of this conventional wisdom about the
U.S. RUDs practice. Most of the essay is devoted to showing that, as a
descriptive matter, and contrary to conventional wisdom, the U.S. RUDs
are not unique, even among liberal democracies. Rather, as parts I and II
show, the U.S. RUDs practice is functionally similar to the practice of other
liberal democracies (including European liberal democracies) which, like
the United States, take reservations to important human rights treaties, decline to make these treaties domestically enforceable, and generally show a
preference for local and regional human rights norms and institutions over
international ones. Part III of the essay then sketches an explanation and
defense of this practice.
I.

THE UNEXCEPTIONAL U.S. RESERVATIONS AND UNDERSTANDINGS

Reservations and understandings are ways that States qualify consent
to treaties. Reservations are acts of nonconsent to particular treaty terms.9
Understandings are "interpretive statements that clarify or elaborate"l0 the
meaning of particular treaty terms as understood by the consenting State. In
examining the U.S. practice of imposing reservations and understandings, I
will focus attention on the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), "the cornerstone of modern international human rights
law."ll The ICCPR is the best treaty to study in connection with the exceptionalist charge, because it is the most important and comprehensive human
rights treaty, touching on every conceivable political and civil right.
The U.S. consented to almost all of the provisions in the ICCPR. It
took reservations to four provisions: the limitations on capital punishment,
the prohibition on hate speech and war propaganda, the rule that a convicted
6. Id.
7. Id. at 348.
8. Id. at 349.
9. Congo Research Serv., Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the U.S.
Senate, Sen. Comm. Print 106-71 at 125 (Jan. 2, 2001) (available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.
gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_conR-senate_print&docid=f:66922.pdf) [hereinafter CRS
Study] (defining reservations as "specific qualifications or stipulations that modify U.S. obligations without necessarily changing the treaty language"); cf Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties art. 2(1)(d) (May 23, 1969), 8 I.L.M. 679, 681 (defining reservation as "purports to
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that
State").
10. CRS Study, supra n. 9, at 125.
11. William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party? 21 Brook. J. IntI. L. 277, 277 (1995).
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criminal can take advantage of postconviction sentence reductions, and the
prohibition on treating juveniles as adults. In addition, the United States
made clear its understanding that certain provisions that it did consent tothe prohibition on cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; certain rules
concerning discrimination and the right to counsel; the process of compensating those wrongly convicted; and certain aspects of double jeopardywere no more stringent than analogous rules under the U.S. Constitution. 12
These reservations and understandings had overwhelming bipartisan
support. 13
There is nothing unusual about the practice of imposing reservations to
human rights treaties to conform the treaty obligations to the contours of
domestic law. To the contrary, the practice is common. Over one-third of
the parties to the ICCPR have qualified their consent to the ICCPR through
reservations or understandings to all but one of the rights provisions in the
ICCPR. 14 This means that the U.S. ICCPR reservations and understandings,
though a minority practice, are not especially unusual.
The practice seems significantly less unusual when we consider the
identities of the parties that make reservations and understandings, and contemplate why they may do so. As the following chart demonstrates, liberal
democratic nations that tend to respect human rights and international law
tend to ratify the ICCPR with reservations and understandings; nonliberal
democracies that tend less to respect human rights and international law do
not attach reservations to the ICCPR. It turns out that U.S. reservations and
understandings are not materially different than ones taken by other liberal
democracies.

12. Off. U.N. High Comm. for Human Rights, For the Record, United Nations, International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, http://www.hrLca/fortherecord2003/documentation/reservations/ccpr.htm (2003) [hereinafter For the RecordJ.
13. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights and Conditional Consent, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399,414-16 (2000).
14. Yogesh Tyagi, The Conflict of Law and Policy on Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, 71 British Y.B. IntI. L. 181, 187 n. 18 (2000).
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RESERVATIONS, UNDERSTANDINGS, AND DECLARATIONS CRUDs) TO THE
l5
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS.

States

RUDs

United Kingdom

16

United States

12

Austria

9

France, Netherlands, Trinidad and Tobago

8

Monaco, Switzerland

7

Belgium, Italy, Malta

6

Denmark, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg

5

Bangladesh, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway,
Thailand, Turkey

4

Algeria, Australia, Belize, Finland, India, Kuwait, Sweden

3

Botswana, Guyana, Romania, South Korea, Syrian Arab Republic

2

Afghanistan, Argentina, Barbados, Bulgaria, Congo, Gambia, Guinea, Hungary,
Iraq, Israel, Japan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mongolia, Russian Federation,
Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen
Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote
D'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Greece,
Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jamaica,
Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Maui, Mauritius, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique,
Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, POitugal, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San
Marino, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland,
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda,
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Zambia, Zimbabwe

0

IS. This chart was previously published as Table 4.2 in Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner,
The Limits of International Law 129 (Oxford U. Press 2005).
This table was derived from four sources: (I) the most recent RUDs collection for
the ICCPR that we could find, see www.hrLca/fortherecord@2003/documentation/
reservations/ccpr.@htm; (2) a United Nations collection of RUDs to the Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which also contains necessary information on
RUDs to the ICCPR for some states, see www.unhrchr.ch/html/menu3/b/
treaty4_asp.htm; (3) the latest United Nations information we could find on ratification
of the ICCPR, see www.unhrchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf; and (4) a source indicating
Swaziland's status as an ICCPR party, see web.anmesty.orglweb/wire.nsf/June20041
Swaziland. All of these sources were last visited on August 16, 2004.
Counting reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs) is difficult and
requires judgment calls. For this table, we counted only those RUDs that actually
qualify state consent to the ICCPR. This means, for example, that we did not count the
United States declaration that the ICCPR is non-self-executing. A more vexing problem
is how to count a RUD that qualifies consent to two parts of one article in a treaty.
Where the two references within the same article are closely related, we conservatively
count this as a single RUD. For example, Finland, Iceland, and other states reserve the
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Consider the United Kingdom. It opted out of the ICCPR's rights to (a)
free expression and assembly, to the extent that these rights conflicted with
extant UK legislation; (b) free legal assistance, in certain places; (c) equality of marriage rights, when doing so conflicted with local domicile law; (d)
vote and serve in public office, in various contexts; (e) segregate juvenile
and adult prisoners, both convicted and accused; (1) freedom from imprisonment for contract violations, in Jersey; (g) freedom from arbitrary deprivation of the right to enter one's own country, to the extent that it conflicted
with extant UK immigration law; (h) require that children have a nationality, to the extent that this right conflicted with extant UK law; and (i) to
avoid marriage "without the free and full consent of the intending spouses"
for customary marriages in the Solomon Islands. In addition, the UK
broadly reserved the right to apply to certain persons (including military
personnel and lawfully detained persons) "such laws and procedures as they
may from time to time deem to be necessary for the preservation of service
and custodial discipline."16
Similarly, France entered several reservations and understandings to
qualify its consent to the ICCPR. It declined to consent to the ICCPR's
limitation on emergency powers to the extent the limitation might affect
French presidential power and other aspects of French domestic law. It
opted out of an array of criminal procedure rights insofar as they applied to
"the disciplinary regime in the armies." It insisted on the right to "make
limited exceptions" to the right to have one's conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal. It declined consent to the requirements for
expelling aliens to the extent that this requirement conflicted with extant
French law. It made clear that various rights of expression, assembly, and
association in the ICCPR must conform to the free expression rights in the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. It limited its consent to the ICCPR prohibition on "propaganda
for war" to legal Will'S, and stated that it understood this provision to be no
more demanding than French law in any event. And finally, France declined
its consent to the ICCPR provision that guaranteed "ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities" the right to "enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language" in light of Article 2 of
right to ignore the juvenile segregation provisions in articles 10(2) and 10(3); we
counted this as a single RUD. Similarly, many EU states qualify their acceptance of
articles 19, 21, and 22 by stating that they accept only those portions that are not in
conflict with European human rights treaties; again, this is treated as one RUD. In
addition, when a state qualifies its consent without specific reference to a provision in
the treaty, this is counted as a single RUD. This occurs, for example, when countries
declare that ratification does not entail recognition of the state of Israel. Even with these
guiding principles, some of our interpretations were, at the margins, difficult. Any
disagreements at the margins, however, do not affect the overall pattern of the table,
which clearly demonstrates that liberal states are Illuch more inclined than nonliberal
states to condition consent to the ICCPR with RUDs.
Id. at 231 n. 1.
16. See For the Record, supra n. 12.
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the French Constitution, called "On Sovereignty," which specifies (among
other things) that the language of the Republic shall be FrenchP
Other prominent European liberal democracies-the Netherlands (8),
Switzerland (8), Austria (6), Belgium (6), Italy (6), Germany (4), Liechtenstein (5), Iceland (4), Ireland (4), Denmark (3), and Finland (3)-have
made numerous reservations/understandings to the ICCPR. 18 These reservations cover many topics, including various trial rights, free speech rights,
immigration rights, and voting rights. 19
In addition to these extensive ICCPR reservations/understandings, internationallaw and human-rights-Ioving European States use other mechanisms to favor regional community norms and institutions over the
universal ICCPR and its associated institutions. Several rights contained in
the ICCPR-including the right of self-determination, the rights of aliens
against expulsion, and the right of ethnic and other minorities to enjoy their
own culture, religion, and language-have no counterpart in the European
Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols. 20 Nonetheless, the EU and
EU States have developed a variety of procedures-including "same matter" reservations, and declarations to Article 41 of the ICCPR-designed to
steer human rights complainants away from international bodies like the
ICCPR Human Rights Committee, and toward the regional EU system. 21
These procedures result in the systematic underenforcement of ICCPR
norms when they conflict with EU norms or with State laws that are the
subjects of a reservation or declaration?2 The ICCPR Human Rights Committee has complained about "the apparent preference accorded, in domestic
law [of EU states] as well as in legal doctrine and jurisprudence, to the
European Convention ... as against the [ICCPR],"23 and has recommended
that EU States alter their constitutions to reflect the provisions of the
ICCPR. 24 The EU has ignored this recommendation.
In addition to this systematic exclusion of the ICCPR from the European human rights system, the European Court of Human Rights (and its
predecessor, the European Commission) engage in the functionally similar
17. [d.
18. [d.
19. [d.
20. See Tyagi, supra n. 14, at 208 n. 106; A.H. Robertson, The United Nations Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, 43 British Y.B. IntI. L.
21, 37-40 (1968-1969); Hellenic Resources Network, European Convention On Human Rights
and its Five Protocols, http://www.hri.org/docsIECHR50.html (Sept. 27, 1995).
21. See Tyagi, supra n. 14, at 195-96, 206-08.
22. See id. at 205-13 (documenting many examples).
23. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee Vol. ['II 76, U.N.
Doc. N49/40 (Sept. 21, 1994) (supplement to volume I).
24. See id. at ~['II 80, 123, 128; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Report of the Human Rights
Committee Vol. /I 'Il'Il 61, 184, U.N. Doc. N54/40 (Jan. 1, 2000); U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Report of the Human Rights Committee Vol. /1'1165, U.N. Doc. AI52/40 (Jan. 1, 1999); see generally Tyagi, supra n. 14, at 208-09.
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practice of embracing national or regional human rights norms and rejecting
more rights-protecting human rights treaty standards when the two conflict.
These bodies have, for example, interpreted European law to provide narrower protections than the ICCPR, as interpreted by the ICCPR Human
Rights Committee, in areas ranging from conscientious objection, to due
process guarantees for civil servants, to the right of privacy in connection
with religious practices. 25
In these and many other ways, European States engage in practices
functionally similar to U.S. RUDs-practices that have the effect of excluding the ICCPR when it conflicts with European understandings about the
proper content of and enforcement mechanism for human rights. One
might try to deflect the significance of the point by arguing that Europe's
chauvinistic rejection of international norms and institutions, unlike the
United States', sometimes (though not always or even usually) takes place
in favor of a regional system that is itself constituted by international law.
After all, the EU States developed this regional human rights system after
concluding that domestic instituitions could not prevent reoccurrence of the
atrocities committed in World War II. One might think that the EU States
are at least beholden to an international institution, albeit a regional one that
(like the U.S. system) reject full incorporation of ICCPR norms.
Despite these points, no normative significance attaches, for present
purposes, to the formalism of a human rights system that is regional and
supranational as opposed to domestic and supreme. It is unclear whether the
EU system is properly analyzed as constituted by international law, or
whether it is better viewed as a transitional, fledgling "domestic" constitutional system (or at least a constitutional community apart from the "international community") akin to the United States under the Articles of
Confederation. 26 But even assuming (as few do) that the EU is a pure international law institution, it is still a nonglobal institution that is narrower
than international institutions like the ICCPR, and its member states are
bound by global treaties like the ICCPR in all of their actions, including
their EU-related actions. Just as the United States could not skirt its international obligations by entering into a treaty with Canada in which the two
countries agreed to be bound by a regional court that would apply U.S.
domestic civil rights law, as a formal matter the EU States and the EU
system remain governed by the ICCPR and similar institutions. The fact
that the EU established a human rights system via regional international law
25. See Laurence R. Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 285,
331-33 n. 168 (1999).
26. The emerging conventional wisdom is that it is a constitutional system. See e.g. Paul
Craig, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union, 7 European L. J. 125 (2001);
Joseph Weiler, European Constitutionalism: Beyond the State (Cambridge U. Press 2003); J.H.H.
Weiler, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision, 1
European L.J. 219, 220-21 (1995).
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mechanisms rather than through domestic constitutional reform is of no
consequence from the perspective of the obligations of the ICCPR and related institutions. For these reasons, the rationale for the critics insisting that
the United States must fully embrace and domesticate the ICCPR should
apply with full force to EU States, either at the regional or the national
level.
In sum, the practice of European States and of other liberal democracies shows that the U.S. reservation/understanding practice with regard to
the ICCPR is not exceptional. Neither the number nor the type of U.S. reservations and understandings to the ICCPR differ from the ones made by
other liberal democracies in Europe and elsewhere. With regard to the U.S.
reservation/understanding practice and the broader charge of conforming
international obligations to extant domestic law, the exceptionalism charge
is simply false.
II.

NON-SELF-EXECUTING DECLARATIONS

The United States has also attached declarations to all of the major
human rights treaties except the Genocide Convention. Declarations are
"statements of purpose, policy, or position related to matters raised by the
treaty in question but not altering or limiting any of its provisions."27 By far
the most important and controversial U.S. declaration is the one rendering
the human rights treaties non-self-executing. This declaration means that
the human rights treaties are not enforceable by domestic courts unless and
until the political branches act to make them so. In effect, a non-self-executing declaration delegates to the U.S. political branches, rather than to U.S.
courts, the task of implementing international human rights obligations into
domestic law whenever domestic law fails to satisfy these obligations.
Non-self-executing declarations are consistent with the human rights
treaties, which do not require domestic judicial enforcement. 28 Moreover,
the U.S. political branches take seriously their duty to implement international human rights law when necessary. Congress has enacted implementing criminal legislation for the Torture Convention and the Genocide
Convention. 29 It also enacted war crimes legislation to satisfy the human
rights requirements of the Geneva Convention. 30 And although Congress
has never seen fit to implement any parts of the ICCPR, President Clinton
27. CRS Study, supra n. 9, at 126.
28. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights mt. 2(2} (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976) T.S. 14668 (available at http://www.unhchr.chlhtml/menu31b/a_ccpr.htm); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 2,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 9, 1975). The Human Rights Committee recognizes that the ICCPR
"generally leaves it to the States parties concerned to choose their method of implementation in
their territories." U.N. Human Rights Comrn., Article 2, Implementation at the National Level,
General Comment No.3, at 4 (1994) (thirteenth session of the commission).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2000), 18 U.S.c. § 1091 (2000).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000).

2005]

THE UNEXCEPTIONAL U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS RUDS

319

issued an order making human rights treaties binding on executive branch
officials in certain contexts. 31
Setting aside the fact that the United States has in fact domesticated
some important international obligations, there is nothing exceptional about
the general U.S. practice of declaring human rights treaties to be non-selfexecuting. The majority of ICCPR parties, including many liberal democracies, do not apply the ICCPR in domestic courts. 32 For example, all Commonwealth countries view all treaties to be non-self-executing. In these
States, constitutional law prohibits human rights treaties from becoming judicially enforceable domestic law in the absence of separate implementing
legislation. Many of these Commonwealth states, and many other "progressive" States that do not automatically incorporate human rights treatiesincluding Australia, Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom-have not in fact enacted legislation to make the
ICCPR part of domestic law. 33 And many liberal democracies that have
nominally incorporated the ICCPR into domestic law have no reported decisions of domestic courts relying on this law. In most States that have
enacted legislation making the ICCPR part of domestic law, courts have not
relied on the treaty as a source of domestic law. In these nations (which
include Germany, Mexico, Poland, and Russia) the ICCPR has nominal domestic status but no domestic legal force. 34
These examples suggest that there is no relationship between (a) domestic incorporation or domestic judicial enforcement of human rights treaties, and (b) human rights practices on the ground. 35 This suggestion is
confirmed by the list of States (such as Algeria, Cambodia, Columbia,
Egypt, Guatemala, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Rwanda, and Syria) that have incorporated the ICCPR into domestic law but who do not generally respect human
rights. 36 Even when domestic courts invoke the ICCPR (as in the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Nigeria, Senegal, and Venezuela), it is no guarantee
of a commitment to international human rights or international human
rights law. 37 In short, incorporation of human rights treaties does not correlate with respect for human rights. As Harland wryly notes, "The ICCPR
31. Exec. Or. 13107,3 C.F.R. 234 (1999).
32. See Christopher Harland, The Status of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) in the Domestic Law of State Parties: An Initial Global Survey Through UN
Human Rights Committee Documents, 22 Human Rights Q. 187 (2000); Christof Heyns & Frans
Viljoen, The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level, 23
Human Rights Q. 483 (2001).
33. Harland, supra n. 32, at 193.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. [d. at 257-60; see U.S. Dept. St., CountlY Reports on Human Rights Practices (available
at http://www.stale.gov/g/rl/hr/c1470.htm) (last updated Feb. 2005).
37. Harland, supra n. 32, at 193.
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does not exist in domestic Swedish law, while in Rwanda, at the time of the
1994 genocide, the ICCPR ranked above its domestic legislation. "38
In sum, the U.S. non-self-executing declarations are not uncommon.
Most nations, including many liberal democracies, have not made the
ICCPR part of domestic law enforceable by domestic courts.

III.

WHY Do LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES FAIL TO INCORPORATE
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW?

Parts I and II showed that the United States' practice of declining consent to a small number of provisions in the primary human rights treaties,
and of rendering these treaties non-self-executing, cannot meaningfully be
described as "exceptional." Most liberal democracies conform international
human rights law obligations to the contours of local law via reservations
and related mechanisms, and many do not permit the treaties to be enforced
in domestic courts. As Tyagi accurately notes, "It is apparent that, in spite
of assuming the leadership of the human rights movement, the West remains unwilling to accept international human rights law
wholeheartedly. "39
Why would liberal democratic States that are among the most successful in the world in protecting human rights decline to fully embrace the
international human rights law system? Why has the U.S. critics' preferred
approach to human rights enforcement-domestic judicial enforcement of
human rights treaties ratified without qualification-been expressly rejected
by the two most successful human rights systems in the world (the EU
system and the U.S. system)? These questions present major and largely
unconsidered puzzles for the international human rights movement that demand explanation and, if possible, normative justification. This part
sketches tentative answers.

1.

Respect for International Law

One possible explanation for reservations to human rights treaties is
that the reservations evince respect for international law-especially when
reservations are taken to just a few of many provisions. This was the view
of Senator Moynihan, a friend of international law. 40 He defended the
ICCPR reservations by noting that the United States "has undertaken a meticulous examination of U.S. practice to insure that the United States will in
fact comply with the obligations that it is assuming," which "can certainly
38. Id.
39. Tyagi, supra n. 14, at 189 (emphasis added).
40. See Daniel Patrick Moynihan, On the Law of Nations (Harv. U. Press 1990) (arguing for
strong adherence by the United States to international law).
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be viewed as an indication of the seriousness with which the obligations are
regarded rather than as an expression of disdain for the obligations."41
In the Moynihan view, U.S. RUDs demonstrate that the United States
has taken great care in examining whether it can conform its domestic behavior to the treaty norms, and, on the expectation that it intends to comply,
it declines consent in the relatively few instances when it cannot. The Moynihan view seems especially compelling because, as figure 1 shows, the
ICCPR signatories that are least respectful of human rights and international law tend not to take any reservations to the ICCPR. 42
2.

Mature Domestic Systems

The second reason why liberal democracies have rejected the internationalist approach is that they have flourishing, mature, organic legal protections for human rights under domestic and regional systems that would
be jeopardized by the wholesale incorporation of international law. Quite
simply, the losses of wholesale incorporation of international norms outweigh the gains from a human rights perspective.
Wholesale incorporation of RUD-Iess human rights treaties would inject into the domestic legal system a host of new and differently worded
norms that would require interpretation and elaboration. The sudden, direct
application of these new and differently worded norms could affect the domestic civil and political rights system in multiple unforeseen ways, and
would potentially require reinterpretation and reelaboration of every domestic civil and political right.
Government officials in liberal democracies could not responsibly superimpose the later-in-time ICCPR system on its organic domestic human
rights system. The vast majority of the ICCPR's rights are like those guaranteed by U.S. domestic constitutional and statutory law-this is why the
United States ratified the treaty with very few reservations. But to consent
to the vaguely worded nOlms and promise to act consistent with them is one
thing; it is something quite different to make these differently worded
norms subject to litigation in and interpretation by domestic courts. For the
ICCPR rights are couched in different language than analogous domestic
U.S. protections. Its differently worded terms would thus lead to litigation
in every circumstance in which the terms differed.
Consider one of dozens of possible examples. Article 26(1) of the
ICCPR provides:
41. 138 Congo Rec. S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
42. Cf Arthur Rovine, Defense of Declarations, Reservations, and Understandings, in U.S.
Ratification of the Human Rights Treaties: With or Without Resen1ations? 54, 57 (Richard B.
Lillich ed., U. Press of Va. 1981) ("It is very easy to sign a human rights treaty without any
reservations .... Many authoritarian regimes have done so.").
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All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect,
the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status. 43
Imagine the questions that this provision would raise if it were made part of
domestic law. Would the guarantee of equal protection without "any" discrimination eliminate all forms of affirmative action in the United States?
Would the guarantee of "effective" in addition to "equal" protection entail
an effects test for all U.S. discrimination law? What other changes would it
bring? Would its "protection against discrimination on any ground," including "status," extend to discrimination on the basis of homosexuality? Age?
Weight? Beauty? Intelligence? These are just a few of the broader questions
raised by Article 26. There are hundreds of other smaller details of domestic
anti-discrimination law-statutes of limitation, burdens of proof, disparate
impact analysis, immunity rules, and scores of other case-law intricaciesthat would be open to litigation and potential change.
It would be easy to walk through the ICCPR and raise hundreds, indeed thousands, of similar questions. The answers to these questions might
change U.S. civil and political rights significantly. Even if U.S. judges interpreted these provisions in accordance with American traditions and experience, a domesticated ICCPR would create extensive confusion and
uncertainty, and might change in unpredictable directions. There would be
litigation over the manifold ways in which the terms of the ICCPR depart
from domestic law. This litigation would invariably produce some, and perhaps many, changes in domestic human rights protection. There is no way
to tell in advance whether these changes would expand or contract domestic
human rights protections, much less whether the changes would be wise.
The potential changes to the United States' enormously complex, well-developed, and largely successful human rights system would be so extensive
and so uncertain that, I submit, we cannot really imagine responsible politicians embracing these changes.
This is not just a concern of the United States. It is also why Europe
has declined to incorporate the ICCPR into its domestic and regional human
rights regimes. Europe's reasons for preferring the EU system to the ICCPR
are similar to the reasons why the United States prefers its rights system to
the international system: because the EU system is older than the ICCPR
system, because review of EU decisions by ICCPR bodies "might create the
impression of an 'appeal' from the former to the latter and undermine, or at
least weaken, the authority of [EU] Institutions," because they worry about
43. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra n. 28, at art. 26.
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an overly "liberal interpretation" by the ICCPR Human Rights Committee
of "some of the general provisions" of the ICCPR, and because "they prefer
the more exclusive approach of the European Convention, in contrast with
the thrust of the UN human rights treaties. "44
There is a larger point here. Liberal democracies decline consent to
some aspects of international human rights law and resist its wholesale domestic incorporation because the abstract norms in the international treaties,
if directly incorporated as the RUDs critics would like, would lack local
legitimacy. RUDs critics would like a direct pipeline from international
treaties to domestic judicial enforcement, without the intermediating influences and compromises of democratic politics. In the domestic legal system
in the United States, both the constitutional and legislative articulation of
these rights are subject to, and informed by, vigorous public debate and
influence through the electoral and judge-confirmation processes, among
others. These democratic influences, in turn, make the human rights that
emerge from this system legitimate to the citizens who enjoy, and often
must sacrifice for, these rights. But without such debates and compromises
and accommodations of vague international norms to local conditions and
traditions, there is little reason to believe that the people in liberal democracies-at least in the United States-would accept such norms and view
them as legitimate.
There is always a tension between legalization of human rights norms
(whether domestically or internationally) and the resolution of conflicting
conceptions of human rights through democratic governance. The United
States has long struggled with this tension, usually in debates about the
appropriate occasion for and scope of judicial enforcement of fundamental
constitutional norms. In the past thirty years, the U.S. legal and political
culture has become increasingly aware of the limitations of judicial control
of human rights progress, and of the importance (both as a matter of fact,
and as a normative matter) of democratic deliberation to resolve fundamental moral issues such as the death penalty, abortion, homosexual rights, discrimination, and the like. 45 Although there is much debate about where the
line between judicial and democratic control should be drawn, the RUDs
critics embrace an extreme position that rejects the importance of democratic deliberation altogether, even for rights at the margin of consensus.
Although internationalist critics of U.S. human rights practices purport to
be committed to liberal democracy as the optimal form of domestic govern-

44. Tyagi, supra n. 14, at 196, 207-08.
45. See e.g. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? (U. of Chicago Press 1991); Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away Froll! the
Courts (Princeton U. Press 1999); Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (Oxford U. Press 2004).
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ance,46 their RUDs position attempts to isolate human rights enforcement
from democratic politics altogether.
Consider only a few of the more obvious differences between the U.S.
and EU human rights systems-the two most successful such systems in the
world. The U.S. system developed organically within domestic law. Its details reflect unique American historical and legal traditions and experiences,
including (among many other things) the tradition of a written Constitution
and judicial review, the centrality of slavery and its redress in the Civil
War, the post-War Amendments, the civil rights revolutions of the twentieth century, and the continuing importance of federalism. Europe's much
different approach to human rights law is based on entirely different historical and cultural traditions. If U.S. human rights law has been intimately
informed by the problem of slavery and race relations, the European system
has been intimately informed by the catastrophes of World Wars I and II,
culminating in the horrors of the Holocaust. The post-World War II desire
for human rights improvement among European States, combined with an
absence of confidence in domestic institutions to achieve this aim and a
relatively benign attitude (compared to the United States) toward transnational institutions, led Europeans to establish a human rights system at the
regional level in combination with other elements of regional integration.
There are many differences of institutional detail between the two systems. European rights tend to have less legislative input on the front end
prior to judicial interpretation, but European Court of Human Rights interpretations of European Convention norms lack direct force within any national system, but rather must be implemented by local legislatures. By
contrast, the U.S. legislature has more influence over the creation of rights
(through legislation and judicial confirmation), but U.S. judicial interpretations of rights provisions are directly enforceable against federal and state
officials.
There are important differences in substantive detail as well. Article 20
of the ICCPR prohibits "any propaganda for war" and "any advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence."47 These provisions reflect a highly contested
conception of free speech, one that many ICCPR parties rejected or qualified through reservations and understandings. Similarly contested, even
among liberal democracies, is the ICCPR's commitment to criminal rehabilitation (as opposed to deterrence or incapacitation),48 to the segregation
of juvenile criminals,49 to a 1960s conception of property rights,50 to
46. See e.g. Deliberative Democracy and Human Rights (Harold Hongju Koh & Ronald C.
Slye eds., Yale U. Press 1999).
47. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra n. 28, at art. 20.
48. Id. at art. 1O(2)(b).
49. Id. at art. 10(2).

50. Id. at art. 1(2).
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prohibitions on racial and sexual and religious "distinctions of any kind,"51
and more.
Most observers would acknowledge that these abstract ICCPR rights
are not necessarily optimal, and that there might be disagreements over
whether they are always and everywhere appropriate. But once this possibility is admitted, and once we consider that we live in a world of States
characterized by radically different rights cultures and legal traditions, radically different historical experiences, and radically different economic and
social endowments, it becomes difficult to think that any single system for
human rights creation and enforcement will always and everywhere be best.
3.

International Law Fetishization

The internationalists' preoccupation with full ratification of human
rights treaties and with automatic domestic judicial control over their implementation is puzzling. Human rights treaties are not the product of democratic deliberation. Rather, they tend to be drafted by unaccountable
bureaucrats that do not necessarily hail from rights-respecting States,52 and
they tend to be written at a level of abstraction and compromise that is
designed to maximize ratifications among very differently situated States.
There is nothing inherently legitimate or necessarily optimal about the
norms as worded in these treaties.
The internationalist insistence that States must embrace human rights
treaties' terms as written and enforce them domestically is all the more
puzzling because there is no demonstrable relationship between the internationalists' desired state of affairs and genuine respect for human rights. Empirical studies show no statistical relationship between human rights treaty
ratification and either respect for human rights or improvement in human
rights performance. 53 (By contrast, empirical studies do find statistical relationships between democracy, peace, and developed economies, on the one
hand, and protection of human rights, on the other.)54 Relatedly, as part I
discussed, there is an inverse correlation between the number of reservations to the ICCPR and respect for human rights. The evidence in part I also
suggested that there is no relationship whatsoever between the enforceabil51. Id. at art. 2(1).
52. For example, the ICCPR was drafted by the UN Commission on Human Rights and the
Third Committee of the UN General Assembly.
53. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 Yale L.J.
1935 (2002); Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does it Make A Difference? 36 J. Peace Research 95 (1999).
54. Steven C. Poe & C. Neal Tate, Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the
1980s: A Global Analysis, 88 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 853 (1994); Steven C. Poe, The Decision to
Repress: An Integrative Theoretical Approach to Research on Human Rights and Repression, in
Understanding Human Rights Violations: New Systematic Studies 16 (Sabine C. Carey & Steven
C. Poe eds., Ashgate 2004).
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ity of international human rights law in domestic courts and genuine respect
for human rights.
This all suggests that in liberal democracies, something besides ratification and incorporation of human rights treaties is doing the work when
human rights flourish. In this light, it is unclear why internationalists are so
insistent that the relatively successful U.S. human rights system fully embrace the ratification/incorporation project.
A possible explanation for the insistence on full U.S. ratification and
incorporation of universal human rights treaties is concern about the effect
of the U.S. attitude to international human rights on countries in transition.
Many scholars claim that the U.S. RUDs practice has bad effects on human
rights in other countries, either because it gives other countries an excuse
not to respect human rights, or because it undermines the United States'
ability to exercise moral leadership in these countries. 55 This concern, however, rests on the same misplaced belief in the importance of ratification
and incorporation of human rights treaties that form the basis of the RUDs
criticism in the first place. The fact is that there is no evidence that the
United States' failure to consent fully to human rights treaties or make them
enforceable in U.S. courts has any effect whatsoever on international
human rights practices in other States.
The United States began ratifying modern human rights treaties twenty
years ago, and it has attached RUDs to all subsequent human rights treaties.
During this same period, international human rights law has, by any measure, flourished. The claim that the U.S. RUDs practice harms the human
rights movement becomes even less convincing when one considers the
many ways that the United States influences human rights development
around the world outside the context of the human rights treaties. The
United States exerts much of its influence through the example of its own,
non-treaty-based human rights standards, which RUDs have not diminished
at all. The United States is also the nation that most aggressively pressures
other nations to improve their human rights standards, through economic
and military sanctions and through participation in international institutions.
These practices once again are not affected by the RUDs. Probably the two
greatest influences on the spread of human rights during the past twenty
years has been the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War and economic liberalization. The U.S. RUDs did not delay these accomplishments.
In the end the internationalist position probably rests on a belief that
preferred civil rights outcomes-in terms of, say, capital punishment and
prison practices-would be better secured by a regime of full ratification
55. See e.g. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the lnternatioanl Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 1169, 1173
(Summer 1993); Lori F. Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 515, 515-16 (1991); Henkin,
supra n. 1; Deliberative Democracy and Human Rights, supra n. 45.
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and incorporation, This might be correct, but it might also not be, for reasons stated above. But even taking the argument on its own terms, the argument is couched at the wrong level of abstraction. Yes, there is certainly
room for improvement in the civil rights practices of liberal democracies.
But across-the-board criticisms of RUDs and related practices are overbroad formalistic arguments that do not get at what might or might not be
wrong with these practices,

